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This article outlines the regime of statutory liability and financial responsibility
requirements for the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland offshore areas with a
particular emphasis on the content and validityof the Nova Scotia and Newfound-
land Boards' jointly issued Guidelines for Financial Responsibility.
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Introduction
The purpose of this article is to outline the essential elements of the
statutory liability scheme applicable to oil and gas operations in the
offshore areas of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, as well as the admin-
istrative requirements in respect of financial responsibility. Oil and gas
exploration and production activities in the offshore areas of Nova Scotia
and Newfoundland are governed by federal and provincial legislation
enacted to implement political accords between each province and the
federal government. The Nova Scotia and Newfoundland accords and the
legislation implementing them are similar. These accords were imple-
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mented by enacting essentially identical federal and provincial legisla-
tion, thereby avoiding the issue of whether the federal government or the
province had jurisdiction in each case.'
The accords provide that offshore oil and gas resources will be
managed jointly by the federal and provincial governments through
boards established under the AccordActs. The board having management
and administrative responsibility for the Nova Scotia offshore area2 is the
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board (Nova Scotia Board, or
Board). The corresponding board for the Newfoundland offshore area is
the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (Newfoundland
Board; the Newfoundland Board and the Nova Scotia Board are together
referred to as the Boards).
I. Liability
Civil liability for damage from offshore oil and gas operations can arise
under common law and statute. A discussion of the common law is
beyond the scope of this article, but the scheme of statutory liability under
the Nova Scotia AccordAct will be briefly described, as it is the main basis
for the financial responsibility requirements. Liability can also arise
under contract, for example under voluntary compensation plans adopted
by industry or as a result of licence conditions or conditions of approval.
1. For the Nova Scotia offshore area: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources
Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1988, c. 28 [hereinafter the Nova Scotia Accord Act], and
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia)
Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3. For the Newfoundland offshore area: Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic
Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, c. 3, and The Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord
Implementation (Newfoundland) Act, S.N. 1986, c. 37. For brevity, this article will reference
only the federal act applicable to the Nova Scotia offshore area, the Nova Scotia Accord Act,
and the regulations thereunder. However, the corresponding sections of the federal Act and
regulations applicable to the Newfoundland offshore area are essentially the same, as are the
corresponding sections of each of the provincial acts and regulations. (The federal and
provincial versions of the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland Acts are herein collectively referred
to as the Accord Acts.)
2. The limits of the Nova Scotia offshore area are described in Schedule I to the Nova Scotia
Accord Act, ibid. Newfoundland has challenged the boundary between Newfoundland and
Nova Scotia as set out in the Nova Scotia Accord Act and this dispute is currently proceeding
to arbitration.
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1. Statutory Liability
Statutory liability for damage resulting from offshore oil and gas opera.
tions arises primarily under the Nova Scotia Accord Act, although tht
FisheriesAct also provides for civil liability if deleterious substances ar
deposited in waters "frequented by fish" without authorization.4 Par
XVI of the Canada Shipping Act5 provides, for civil liability for oi
pollution from ships, but this Part is generally inapplicable to oil and ga,
operations.'
The Nova Scotia AccordAct deals specifically with liability for spills7
and debris.' It provides that where a spill occurs in any portion of thc
offshore area,
the person who is required to obtain an authorization.., in respect of the
work or activity from which the spill.., emanated is liable, without proof
of fault or negligence, up to any prescribed limit of liability for
(i) all actual loss or damage incurred by any person as a result of the spill
... and
(ii) the costs and expenses reasonably incurred by the Board or Her
Majesty in right of Canada or the Province or any other person in taking
any action or measure in relation to the spill ....
The Nova Scotia Accord Act therefore makes the operator absolutely
liable for spills up to a prescribed limit, which is currently $30 million."°
Unlike the Fisheries Act, which provides for limited defences to its
absolute liability provisions, there are no statutory defences to the
3. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14.
4. Ibid., s. 36(3).
5. R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9.
6. Ibid., s. 674(2) provides that Part XVI does not apply to "a drilling ship that is on locatior
and engaged in the exploration or exploitation of the sea-bed or its subsoil, in so far as the
discharge of the pollutant emanates from those activities."
7. "Spill" is defined in Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 1, s. 165(1), as a discharge,
emission or escape of "petroleum" (defined in s. 2 as essentially crude oil or natural gas) othei
than an authorized discharge, emission or escape, or a discharge of a pollutant caused by oi
otherwise attributable to a ship (in respect of which the Canada Shipping Act applies).
8. "Debris" is defined in the Nova Scotia Accord Act, ibid., s. 165(2), as "any installation oi
structure that was put in place in the course of any work or activity required to be authorized
under paragraph 142(1)(b) and that has been abandoned without such authorization as may be
required by or pursuant to this Part, or any material that has broken away or been jettisoned ol
displaced in the course of any such work or activity."
9. Ibid., s. 167.
10. Canada-Nova Scotia Oil and Gas Spills and Debris Liability Regulations, S.O.R./95-123
Financial Responsibility Requirements for Oil and Gas Activities Offshore 113
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland
absolute liability provisions in the Nova Scotia Accord Act. In addition,
the Nova Scotia Accord Act provides for unlimited liability to the extent
that negligence or fault can be shown:1'
all persons to whose fault or negligence the spill... is attributable or who
are by law responsible for others to whose fault or negligence the spill..
. is attributable are jointly and severally liable, to the extent determined
according to the degree of the fault or negligence proved against them, for
all actual loss or damage incurred by any person as a result of the spill... 12
Similar provisions apply with respect to debris.13 "Actual loss or dam-
age" is defined to include loss of income, including future income, and,
with respect to any aboriginal peoples of Canada, loss of hunting, fishing
and gathering opportunities. 14
The Nova Scotia Accord Act specifically provides that these liability
provisions do not suspend or limit (a) any legal liability or remedy for an
act or omission by reason only that the act or omission gives rise to
liability under these provisions, (b) any recourse, indemnity or relief
available at law to a person who is liable under these provisions against
any other person, or (c) the operation of any applicable law or rule of law
that is not inconsistent with these provisions. 15
11. The liability provisions of the Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 1, as originally passed
in 1988 made an operator absolutely liable for oil spills and debris attributable to his work or
activity up to the prescribed limit (whether or not the operator was negligent or at fault) and in
addition made the operator liable potentially beyond that limit to the extent that negligence or
fault could be shown, together with any other parties who were negligent or at fault. Since the
paragraphs dealing with fault or negligence did not limit liability to the prescribed limit, and
since those paragraphs referred to "all" actual loss or damage, it was generally accepted that
liability was unlimited in cases of fault or negligence.
However, in 1992 the Nova Scotia Accord Act was amended to add s. 167(2.1). This provides
that where the statutory liability provisions apply, no person will be liable for more than the
greater of the prescribed limit for absolute liability for spills or debris ($30 million) and the
amount for which the person would be liable under any other law for the same occurrence. This
subsection is not limited to the paragraphs dealing with absolute liability but applies to all of
s. 167(1) and (2), including the paragraphs creating liability in cases of fault or negligence. The
limitation of liability even in cases of fault or negligence would appear to be a drafting error;
it is suggested that the reference to "'subsection (1) or (2)" should read "paragraph (1)(a) or
(2)(a)" (the absolute liability provisions). It appears from the marginal heading that the purpose
of this amendment was merely to prevent double liability.
12. Ibid., s. 167(l)(b).
13. Ibid., s. 167(2).
14. Ibid., s. 165(3).
15. Ibid., s. 167(4).
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2. Liability and Indemnity Provisions in Licence Documents
Despite the fact that the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland Accord Acts
address liability, both Boards include related provisions in their licences.
The practice of the two Boards is different in this regard; although both
Boards include a clause in their exploration licences providing for an
indemnity in favour of the Board and the federal and provincial govern-
ments, 16 the Newfoundland form of exploration licence has an additional
clause specifically making all interest holders in a licence liable for
damages arising out of work conducted on the licence "by, through, or
under, or with the consent of' the interest holder. A full discussion of
these provisions is beyond the scope of this article. However, a couple of
observations will be made.
First, there is an issue concerning the validity of these provisions.
There is no direct authority in the Nova Scotia Accord Act for including
liability and indemnity provisions in licences.17 Section 70 provides that
an exploration licence shall contain such terms and conditions as may be
prescribed by regulation, however, no such regulation has been promul-
gated. It is arguable that since the issue of liability is already addressed
in the Nova Scotia Accord Act, presumably comprehensively, it beyond
the power of the Board to modify or even to supplement the statutory
scheme. The technique used by the Board to overcome this potential
objection is to obtain the deemed agreement of the interest holders to the
terms and conditions of the licence.'8 This is done by specifically
providing in each call for bids that the submission of a bid shall constitute
agreement to the terms and conditions set out in the form of exploration
licence. '9
The second observation is that in addition to modifying and supple-
menting the liability provisions applicable to the operator, the inclusion
of these provisions in exploration licences imposes liability on the
interest holders. The liability provisions of the Nova Scotia Accord Act
are contained in Part III, which deals generally with operational matters.
There are no similar provisions in Part II, which deals with rights to
explore for and produce oil and gas. There is nothing in the Nova Scotia
16. For the wording currently used by the Newfoundland Board, see the sample exploration
licence attached to Call for Bids NFO- 1, closing Novembei 15, 200. For the Wording used
by the Nova Scotia Board, see the sample exploration licence attached to Call for Bids NSOO-1,
dated June 29, 2000 and closing October 30, 2000.
17. Although s. 58(2) of the Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 1, contemplates that an
interest owner or interest holder may be liable to the Crown by way of indemnity.
18. Section 70(1) provides that an exploration licence may contain other terms and conditions
agreed on by the Board and the interest owner.
19. See e.g. para. 3 of Call for Bids NSOO-1 dated June 29,2000 and closing October 30, 2000.
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Accord Act that imposes liability on an interest holder simply because it
is an interest holder. Of course, an interest holder could be liable at
common law, or could be liable if it is also the operator, or is at fault or
negligent. However, the drafters of the legislation apparently considered
the question of liability and saw fit to confine these provisions to Part III,
which deals with operations and is generally directed at persons autho-
rized to conduct works and activities. It is operations that will potentially
result in damage, not the mere status as an interest holder.
II. Statutory Requirements Relating to Financial Responsibility
Financial responsibility requirements for oil and gas operations are
contained in the Nova Scotia Accord Act, the Nova Scotia Offshore
Petroleum Drilling Regulations20 and the Nova Scotia Offshore Area
Petroleum Production and Conservation Regulations.2'
1. Nova Scotia Accord Act
The Nova Scotia Accord Act provides that an applicant for an authoriza-
tion "in respect of any work or activity in any portion of the offshore area
shall provide proof of financial responsibility in the form of a letter of
credit, a guarantee or indemnity bond or in any other form satisfactory to
the Board, in an amount satisfactory to the Board. ' '22 The holder of an
authorization must ensure that the proof of financial responsibility
remains in force for the duration of the work or activity in respect of which
the authorization is issued.
21
The Board may pay out funds available under this security in respect
of any claim for which proceedings may be instituted under the statutory
liability provisions dealing with spills and debris, whether or not such
proceedings have in fact been instituted.24 Such payments may not
exceed the amount prescribed for any case or class of cases, or determined
by the Board in the absence of regulations. If a claim is sued for under the
liability provisions of the Nova Scotia AccordAct, the amount of any such
compensation payments received by the claimant is deducted from the
award made pursuant to the action in respect of the same loss.25 This is
all supposed to be monitored by and subject to the review of a statutory
20. S.O.R./92-676 [hereinafter Drilling Regulations].
21. S.O.R./95-190.
22. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 1, s. 168(1).
23. Ibid., s. 168(1.1).
24. Ibid., s. 168(2).
25. Ibid., s. 168(3).
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committee consisting of members appointed by the federal and provincial
governments and by representatives of the petroleum and fisheries
industries, although no such committee has been set up.
26
The Nova Scotia AccordAct also provides that in authorizing any work
or activity, the Board may make its authorization subject to "such
requirements and deposits as the Board determines or as may be pre-
scribed, including (a) requirements relating to liability for loss, damage,
costs or expenses .... 27
2. Regulations
The Drilling Regulations provide that
[e]very operator shall, prior to drilling or re-entering a well,
(a) furnish the Board with evidence of financial responsibility in a form
and in an amount satisfactory to the Board or any person designated by the
Board, for the purpose of ensuring that the operator terminates the well and
leaves the drill site in a satisfactory condition in accordance with section
180;29 and
(b) furnish the Board with evidence, in a form satisfactory to the Board
or any person designated by the Board, that the operator is financially able
to meet any financial liability that may be incurred as a result of the drilling
of a well or of any operation in the well. 9
It will be noted that the "evidence of financial responsibility" referred
to in paragraph (a) above is intended to operate as a guarantee ("for the
purpose of ensuring") while the "evidence" referred to in paragraph (b)
appears to merely require a demonstration that the operator is able to meet
its financial liabilities.
The Nova Scotia Offshore Area Petroleum Production and Conserva-
tion Regulations provide as follows:
10. For the purposes of subsection 142(4) of the Act and in respect of an
authorization issued pursuant to paragraph 142(1)(b) of the Act to carry on
a work or activity in relation to the development of a pool or field or the
production of petroleum, the operator shall, before the work or activity is
started, submit to the Board
26. Ibid., s. 169.
27. Ibid., s. 142(4).
28. Section 180 relates to abandonment and provides that "[elvery operator shall ensure that
on the termination of any well the seafloor is cleared of any material or equipment that could
interfere with other commercial uses of the sea, unless the Board or any person designated by
the Board, having been satisfied that no interference with the commercial use of the sea is
reasonably likely to result, otherwise approves."
29. Supra note 20, s. 72.
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(a) evidence of financial responsibility, of a type and in an amount that is
sufficient to ensure that the operator
(i) completes the work or activity, and
(ii) leaves the site where the Work or activity was carried on in
the state required by Part VII or by the Board pursuant to subsection
142(4) of the Act; and
(b) evidence that the operator is able to meet any financial liability that
might be incurred in connection with the work or activity.30
As with the Drilling Regulations, the "evidence of financial responsibil-
ity" referred to in paragraph (a) is intended to operate as a guarantee while
the "evidence" referred to in paragraph (b) goes to the ability of the
operator to meet financial liabilities.
III. Financial Responsibility Guidelines
Both the Nova Scotia Accord Act and the regulations provide that the
required evidence of financial responsibility shall be in a form and in an
amount satisfactory to the Board. In 1992, the Nova Scotia Board and the
Newfoundland Board jointly issued guidelines outlining the require-
ments of both Boards with respect to drilling operations.3 In May 1999,
following more than a year of consultation with industry, the two Boards
jointly released revised guidelines intended to address financial respon-
sibility requirements for all works and activities in the Newfoundland and
Nova Scotia offshore areas (instead of just drilling operations). 2 Certain
issues arising from these guidelines were never resolved with industry
and are still the subject of discussions between the Canadian Association
of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) and the Boards. The Boards have
indicated that they will be making further revisions to these guidelines in
the near future as a result of these discussions.
30. Supra note 21, s. 10.
31. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board and Canada-Newfoundland Offshore
Petroleum Board, Guidelines Respecting Financial Responsibility Requirements for Drilling
in the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia Offshore Areas (February 1992) [hereinafter 1992
Guidelines].
32. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board and Canada-Newfoundland Offshore
Petroleum Board, Guidelines Respecting Financial Responsibility Requirements for Work or
Activity in the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia Offshore Areas (May 1999) [hereinafter
Guidelines]. The Guidelines are posted on the websites of each Board, online: Canada-Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board homepage <http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca> (date accessed: 26
July 2001); online Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board homepage <http://
www.cnopb.nf.net> (last modified: 24 July 2001). The Guidelines were revised in December
2000, after this article was written.
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Since the Guidelines reflect the current requirements of the Boards.
their main features will be described, followed by a discussion of a
number of issues arising out of them. The Guidelines deal separately with
the following activities: drilling, development or production, decommis-
sioning and other activities such as geophysical operations.
1. Drilling
There are three types of financial security or evidence of financial
responsibility that the Board will require before authorizing drilling
operations. The first is financial security which will give the Board
immediate, unfettered and direct access to cash to enable the Board to
settle claims or to cover the costs of remedial action. This is the evidence
that operates as a guarantee. It is typically provided by a letter of credit
in the form attached to the Guidelines, but other instruments may be
acceptable as well, including a guarantee by a financial institution, an
indemnity bond, marketable securities, or some other arrangement ac-
ceptable to the Board. Insurance or evidence of financial capability will
not be accepted for this purpose because this type of security does not
afford immediate and direct access to cash; in the case of insurance, for
example, the insurer may raise defences to a claim and in any case there
may not be an immediate settlement. The Board will generally require
this type of security in an amount equal to the prescribed limit of absolute
liability, i.e., $30 million. This was the only type of security discussed in
the 1992 Guidelines.
33
Second, in addition to security which provides immediate, unfettered
and direct access, the Board will also require an additional $70 million of
further security that provides an enforceable commitment or mechanism
by which the Board can obtain funds directly, although not necessarily
immediately. Including the first $30 million, the Board may therefore
require up to $100 million of security which it can access directly. The
$70 million layer may be satisfied by insurance which names the Board
as an insured party, giving it direct access to the proceeds of insurance.
Alternatively, if a company has chosen to self-insure or does not want to
modify its insurance program to add the Board as a named insured or to
meet the other requirements of the Board with respect to insurance, the
33. The 1992 Guidelines state that the evidence of financial responsibility required by the
Accord Acts "relates to liability for which proof of fault or negligence is not necessary, and is
required to provide a source of funds as a contingency against claims resulting from seaflool
debris or a petroleum spill." The 1992 Guidelines accordingly provide that the evidence ol
financial responsibility must be in the amount of the prescribed limit of liability and must be
in a form that affords access by the Boards for the purposes of claims settlement.
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Board may accept a promissory note from the company (or its parent or
other affiliate) supported by a current audited financial statement evi-
dencing the company's ability to pay the note. A company may also
satisfy the requirements for the $70 million layer with the types of
security acceptable for the first $30 million layer.
The third type of security applies to amounts above $100 million. The
Board does not require a right of direct access to funds above $100
million; to the extent that evidence of financial responsibility is required
above this amount, a company is merely required to demonstrate that it
has the financial capability to meet any liabilities up to the following
limits:
" removal of debris: up to 25 percent of the reinstatement cost of the
property
" liabilities to third parties: up to $200 million
" well control, making wells safe, pollution clean up: up to $250
million
These limits are on top of the $100 million direct access security. This
third category of evidence may be insurance, an audited financial state-
ment, a guarantee from a third party, including an affiliate, a letter of
credit or indemnity bond, or some other form of security or evidence of
financial responsibility acceptable to the Board. If insurance is used,
deductible amounts must be approved by the Board. In addition, the
Guidelines also require an operator to provide the Board with an indem-
nity agreement. This requirement is discussed further below.
2. Development or Production
A development program will include a number of separate activities
requiring work authorizations. The Guidelines indicate that an operator
can deal with financial responsibility requirements one application at a
time, or alternatively a single package of documentation can be filed
which will apply to all authorizations that are contemplated for the entire
development or for particular phases of the development.
The type of evidence of financial responsibility required will depend
on the nature of the activities. For drilling and production activities, the
same requirements set out above would apply. For other activities, the
Guidelines state that the operator must demonstrate that it is able to meet
any financial liability that may arise out of the work or activity, for
example through insurance. An indemnity agreement is also required.
Evidence of financial responsibility will also be required to ensure that
the work or activity is properly terminated and that the site is left in
satisfactory condition.
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3. Decommissioning of a Production Installation
The Guidelines state that, since each project and production installatior
is unique, requirements respecting evidence of financial responsibilit3
will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. One interesting feature of th,
section is a requirement that the operator must include "the manner anc
form in which any residual liability will be dealt with by the operator an
interest owner, in the event any subsequent claims arise after suci
abandonment/decommissioning occurs, with respect to damages attrib-
utable to the operator's work or activity."
4. Other Work or Activity
Other work or activity includes things such as geological, geophysical ol
geotechnical programs, environmental programs and diving programs,
For these activities, the Guidelines require that the operator demonstrate
the ability to satisfy liabilities for: claims by any person relating to loss
or damage to property, financial loss or injury or death; and claims by an
person relating to the restoration and preservation of the natural environ-
ment, including the seabed. No limits are specified.
The Guidelines suggest that the form of such evidence could be
insurance, an audited financial statement, a corporate guarantee from a
third party, including an affiliate, a letter of credit or indemnity bond oi
some other acceptable form. There is no requirement for security giving
immediate and direct access to cash.
IV. Issues
1. Validity of Guidelines
There is no specific statutory authority for the Guidelines. The Nova
Scotia Accord Act provides that the Board may issue and publish
guidelines and interpretation notes with respect to the application and
administration of s. 45 (benefits plans), s. 142 (work authorizations) and
s. 143 (development plans), and any regulations made under s. 153
(regulations relating to operations).34 The Guidelines arguably relate tc
work authorizations, as an authorization may not be issued until the
required financial security is in place.35
The limits that can be placed on policy statements issued by e
regulatory tribunal were recently considered in Ainsley Financial Corp.
v. Ontario (Ontario Securities Commission).36 In that case the Ontaric
Court of Appeal found that a policy statement issued by the Ontaric
34. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 1, s. 156.
35. Ibid., s. 142.3.
36. (1994), 28 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1, 21 O.R. (3d) 104, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 79 (C.A.).
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Securities Commission had a mandatory character and amounted to an
attempt to impose a defacto legislative scheme, complete with detailed
substantive requirements. The court held that the commission could not
impose such a scheme without the appropriate statutory authority and that
such policy statements must be like guidelines - intended to provide
guidance but without binding effect:
a non-statutory instrument cannot impose mandatory requirements en-
forceable by sanction; that is, the regulator cannot issue de facto laws
disguised as guidelines. The decision of Mr. Justice lacobucci in the Pezim
case is quoted as authority for that proposition, and particularly his
statement that "by that I mean that their policies cannot be elevated to the
status of law ......
If a regulator applies its own guidelines and policies in an automatic
manner, the regulator may be binding itself instead of judging each case
on its own merits. This also effectively elevates guidelines and policies
to the "status of law." This case has been criticized as having taken an
unduly narrow view of the role of regulatory tribunals.38 In any case, with
respect to financial responsibility requirements, the Boards have so far
not applied any requirements automatically, and it would appear that the
Guidelines would not offend Ainsley.
2. Permitted Purposes of Financial Security
The 1992 Guidelines provided that evidence of financial responsibility
was required only for purposes of the absolute liability provisions. These
guidelines were issued in February 1992, before the June 1992 amend-
ments to the Nova Scotia Accord Act.39 Before these amendments were
made, s. 168(1) of the Nova Scotia Accord Act referred to "financial
responsibility for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3)" (which provide
for the payment of claims in respect of spills or debris). The present
language simply requires proof of financial responsibility, and does not
expressly limit its purpose to the payment of claims in respect of spills or
debris under s. 67.
If the present language had not resulted from an amendment, it might
be arguable that because the rest of s. 168 deals with spills and debris, s.
168(1) should be interpreted in this context. However, the amendment
would more likely be interpreted as deliberately expanding the purpose
of financial security beyond spills and debris. Reading this section
together with s. 142(4) and the financial responsibility provisions of the
37. Ibid., at 7 (Admin, L.R.).
38. See A. J. Roman, Case Comment (1996) 32 Admin. L.R. (2d) 28.
39. An Act to amend the Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act and other Acts in
consequence thereof, S.C. 1992, c. 35.
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regulations, discussed above, it would seem that the Board may now
require financial security for other purposes, for example to secure the
payment of costs claimed by the Board to properly abandon a well in
circumstances where the claim does not amount to a claim for debris.
3. Direct Access to Funds
The Nova Scotia Accord Act provides that the Board "may require that
moneys ... be paid out of the amount available under the letter of credit,
guarantee or indemnity bond or other form of financial responsibility..
• in respect of any claim for which proceedings may be instituted under
section 167, whether or not such proceedings have been instituted."40 The
wording of this provision suggests that the Board does not need to have
direct access to the funds itself; otherwise, it would have stated that the
Board itself may pay claims. Instead, it merely enables the Board to
"require" payment. However, there is nothing that prohibits the Board
from requiring direct access and the examples of acceptable security
listed in s. 168(1), i.e., a letter of credit, guarantee or indemnity bond, are
instruments of direct access. Since other forms of financial security need
to be "satisfactory" to the Board, and since the amount of the security is
in the discretion of the Board, the Board would appear to have the
discretion to require security that provides for direct access in any amount
that it deems fit, without regard to the $30 million amount prescribed as
the limit for absolute liability.
However, even if the Board has the authority to require security that
gives it direct access to funds, it does not necessarily follow that the Board
may pay out funds in all cases without a court order. Section 168(2) is the
only provision in the Nova Scotia Accord Act giving the Board authority
to pay out funds available under the financial security, and is limited to
claims which may be made under s. 167, i.e., claims for spills and debris.
Section 167 includes claims for spills or debris in excess of the absolute
liability limit based on fault or negligence. However, the Board itself is
not competent to determine whether or not fault or negligence exists.
Therefore, in making payments out of funds available under the financial
security, the Board will be limited to claims for spills or debris having an
aggregate amount within the limit of absolute liability.
Furthermore, s. 167(3) provides for priority between claims for actual
loss or damage from spills or debris, which rank first, and claims for costs
and expenses, including costs incurred by the Board or governments,
which rank second. Accordingly, if there is the potential for aggregate
40. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note 1, s. 168(2).
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claims to exceed $30 million, the Board may not be able to immediately
use the financial security to pay for remedial action in cases of spills or
debris.
In the absence of a provision giving the Board authority to pay out
funds in respect of other obligations, such as obligations related to
decommissioning, there would seem to be little reason for the Board to
require direct and immediate access to funds. Assuming that a court order
will be required in such cases, it should be sufficient for an operator to
provide evidence of financial capability.
4. Requirement for Indemnity Agreement
One of the main features of the Guidelines that industry has objected to
is the requirement that the operator provide the Board with an indemnity
agreement as agent for the "participating interest holders." The form of
the indemnity agreement is attached to the Guidelines and contains the
following provision:
2. In the event any injury, death, damage to property or to the environ-
ment occurs as a result of any work or activity conducted in relation to the
Authorization, the Operator, as agent for the above participating parties
and interest holders, shall indemnify the Board, the Chief Conservation
Officer and any person delegated by the Board or directed by the Chief
Conservation Officer pursuant to the legislation, from and against any
costs, claims, liabilities and expenses that may arise with respect to such
injury, death or damage, except to the extent of any negligence or wilful
misconduct by or on behalf of the Board, Chief Conservation Officer or
such delegate.41
The Guidelines state that "[tihe purpose of the indemnity agreement is
to provide the assurance to the Board that the operator, as agent for and
together with the parties and interest holders participating in the work or
activity, will indemnify the Board and others, should the other evidence
of financial responsibility be insufficient or otherwise fail to do so.
Consequently the indemnity agreement is intended to be used as a last
resort remedy." This is expressed in the indemnity agreement itself as
follows:
4. The rights of the Board, the Chief Conservation Officer and del-
egates, with respect to this Indemnity Agreement shall be in addition to any
other rights of the Board, its members and employees, arising from any
other evidence of financial responsibility submitted by the Operator,
which rights shall only be exercised through this Indemnity Agreement as
a last resort in the event the other evidence of financial responsibility
provided by the Operator fails to provide such indemnity.
42
41. Supra note 32.
42. Ibid.
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The stated purpose is confusing, because the indemnity agreement is
fundamentally different from other evidence of financial responsibility,
such as a letter of credit or insurance; it does not provide evidence of an
operator's ability to satisfy its own liabilities, but rather protects the
Board from liability.43 It therefore imposes additional liabilities on the
operator and the interest holders. To the extent that such liabilities already
exist, under the Nova Scotia AccordAct or at common law, the indemnity
agreement would be unnecessary. Since the indemnity agreement is not
limited to $30 million, nor to damages for spills and debris, it has the
potential to expand the absolute liability of industry both with respect to
limit as well as the nature of matters giving rise to damages.
As discussed above, the form of exploration licence used by the Board
provides for an indemnity by the holders of shares in the licence in favour
of the Board and the federal and provincial governments." Assuming
that the licence provision is valid and enforceable, a further indemnity
from interest holders would be unnecessary. In fact, if the relevant licence
contains an indemnity provision, an issue may arise as to whether the
indemnity agreement or the licence will prevail if there is an inconsis-
tency. For example, unlike the wording in the exploration licences, the
indemnity agreement provides for an exception in cases of negligence or
wilful misconduct by the Board.
In any case, the operator will not necessarily be an interest holder
(although this is usually the case) and therefore the Board's requirement
for an indemnity from the operator goes beyond the indemnity contained
in the form of exploration licence. Also, the Guidelines require the
operator to provide an indemnity even with respect to work conducted on
Crown reserve area, for example a speculative geophysical survey.
Apart from the contractual basis for requiring an indemnity agreement
from the interest holders under an exploration licence, the justification for
requiring an indemnity as a general matter from an operator would need
to be based on s. 142(4)(a) as a requirement "relating to liability for loss,
damage, costs or expenses." Assuming that the indemnity agreement is
a valid requirement under this provision, the requirement that non-
operating interest holders be bound by the indemnity agreement is
43. Nova Scotia Accord Act, supra note I, s. 17 provides that the governments will indemnify
Board members and Board employees against costs, including amounts paid to settle an action
or satisfy a judgment, reasonably incurred in respect of any civil, criminal or administrative
action or proceeding that they may be parties to because of their position. Also, s. 166(9)
provides for limited immunity against personal liability in cases where Board staff or other
persons take certain actions.
44. Note that the form of indemnity agreement attached to the Guidelines does not provide
for an indemnity in favour of the federal or provincial governments.
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questionable. The financial security requirements in s. 168 of the Nova
Scotia Accord Act apply to the "applicant for an authorization," which
will be the operator. It is also the operator that has absolute liability for
spills and debris under s. 167. Section 167 makes other persons liable for
spills and debris if they are at fault or negligent, or "are by law responsible
for others to whose fault or negligence" the spill or debris is attributable.
However, it is suggested that a non-operator will not be liable under the
Nova Scotia Accord Act merely because it holds an interest in the
licence.45
It is not clear why the Boards continue to require this indemnity. Under
the current form of indemnity agreement, the indemnity does not apply
if the Board is negligent. If the Board is added as a defendant in a lawsuit
because, for example, it approved the operation that resulted in injury or
damage, and it eventually turned out that the Board was not negligent, the
indemnity agreement would serve to protect the Board from costs.
However, there would appear to be no reason why the interest holders
should be responsible for the Board's legal fees in such a case.
Conclusion
The requirement of the Boards for immediate, unfettered and direct
access to funds up to $30 million results in an increase in costs for oil and
gas operators since they need to arrange letters of credit or indemnity
bonds. Up to now, the usual method of satisfying the direct access
requirement has been through the use of letters of credit. Apart from the
cost, the existence of outstanding letters of credit reduces the credit
available to an operator for other activities. The direct access requirement
is of particular concern for long-term production projects, especially if
the Boards require direct access security for abandonment and decom-
missioning obligations that may not arise for twenty years or more.
The companies currently conducting oil and gas operations offshore
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland are all majors with substantial assets; as
a practical matter, it is unlikely that it will ever be necessary for the Boards
to call the financial security posted by these companies. Industry there-
fore argues that the Boards should be prepared to accept some form of
guarantee or undertaking given directly by the operator in cases where
there is sufficient financial capability. However, the other side of that
argument is that the cost of a letter of credit or an indemnity bond should
45. The Boards have been willing to allow each participating company in a joint venture to
individually post a proportionate share of the financial security instead of requiring the entire
amount of security from the operator. This is an accommodation that may be helpful in many
cases, but the involvement of interest holders should be at their option.
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reflect the financial capability of the operator and should be relatively
modest for a substantial company. There may be innovative ways to
reduce costs while still providing acceptable security, for example
through a cooperative arrangement in which a number of operators post
a single security instrument. The Boards have indicated that they would
be prepared to cotsider such an arrangement.46
In the meantime, industry has generally accepted the main features of
the Guidelines, although there are still certain concerns and issues. Some
of these are relatively minor and can probably be resolved through
continued dialogue with the Boards. The main contentious issues appear
to be the requirement for a letter of indemnity and the expansion of
obligations to non-operators. If these issues can be resolved, it should be
possible for the Boards to issue revised guidelines that will have the broad
support of industry.
46. Guidelines, supra note 32, para, 5.1(c).
